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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper demonstrates the use of the income/outcome™ game board as a competitive analysis 
tool. Companies in the floor covering industry are displayed and conclusions for competitive 
strategies are drawn.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ompetitive analysis is one of the key areas in corporate strategies and it appears to increase in relevance 
for US corporations [David, 2005]. Typically competitive analysis utilizes Porter’s Five-Forces Model 
[Porter, 1985, David, 2004, Kotler, 2003], and these five forces describe the areas from where threats on 
a company’s long-term profitability may be coming. These threats are typically described as rivalry within the 
segment, bargaining power on the supply or on the customer side, the threat of new competitors (new entrants), and 
the threat of substitute products.  
 
 The income/outcome™ business simulation is a teaching tool used in industry as well as education to teach 
financial concepts and strategies. During the simulation teams compete against each other in the market while 
considering their cash flow and their costs. The income/outcome™ board has previously been used to visually 
enhance financial analysis [Hergeth, 2004 and 2003] of individual firms, and this paper investigates the usefulness 
of company boards in developing competitive strategies for companies. Specifically, the paper investigates which of 
the Five Forces can be visually displayed on the income/outcome™ company board. 
 
INCOME/OUTCOME™ SIMULATION 
 
Income/Outcome™ is a “simulation-based finance-learning tool that helps to develop business 
visualization skills in all employees” [Andromeda, 2004]. Allowing participants to see business and financial 
activities leads to more identification with their role in the business and to better understanding and learning 
[Hergeth & Smith, 2004]. During the course of the simulation, participants manage a company, make decisions, etc., 
and every business transaction is reflected in a financial transaction that mapped out on the company’s board. Thus 
the income/outcome™ board becomes a simplified visual representation of the company situation at any given 
moment in time. The focus of the board is showing potential cash flow problems, cost structure, leverage issues, 
capital structure, and some key activity ratios.  
 
 The income/outcome™ board (see Figure 1) contains all the major components of the balance sheet and the 
income statement of a company. Equity is displayed as a general indicator of long term success. Debt and accounts 
receivable are displayed as streams that flow into a cash circle over time, providing a visual image of the time 
dimension of money. The board distinguishes investments in land and buildings versus equipment as well as various 
inventories, and it reflects cost structures as overhead costs and costs-of-goods-sold.  
 
C 
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Figure 1: Income/Outcome™ Board 
 
 The purpose of using the 
income/outcome™ simulation is to provide 
business literacy training for members of 
corporations at all levels and in all functions 
[Orbanes, 2002] as well as for students in 
the classroom [Hergeth & Jones, 2003]. At 
the same time the team boards develop 
differently during the course of a simulation 
and display very different company 
situations when compared. Each team of 
participants uses the information on their 
own board in comparison with other boards 
in the simulation to develop a promising 
strategy. All the boards in a room represent 
the competitive situation within a specific 
simulated market.  
 
 Just like the company board can be 
used to enhance the financial analysis of a 
specific company, a group of boards can 
provide a visual image of the competitors 
within a specific market. Of course it is important to realize that the level of abstraction in this case is not limited to 
company variables, but it extends to simplifying the areas of competition and the number of competitors, and most 
importantly the definition of the business field or the market itself. Many companies are active in a variety of 
markets, and competition can sometimes come from rather unexpected areas. An analysis of the company boards 
relative to each other will provide some strategic direction, but not result in recommendation of specific actions. At 
the same time it should provide this general direction that can easily be neglected if day-to-day discussions put too 
much emphasis on tactics and short term opportunities.  
 
COMPETITIVE CASE STUDY 
 
 Five companies within the floor covering market were selected using Hoover’s Online service [Hoovers, 
2004]. The selection of the companies was guided by the list of competitors, excluding companies without published 
annual reports. The companies mostly represent carpet manufacturers, but Pergo and Internacional Ceramica 
represent examples of non-carpet competition that needs to be considered in a competitive analysis. Clearly these 
five companies are not representing the complete market, but they can provide an example of a competitive analysis 
with companies of significant difference in size as well as difference in the specific products they manufacture. The 
analysis is therefore meant as an example of the tool rather than a complete competitive analysis of the floor 
covering market. 
 
 Table 1 shows the five companies with some key financial numbers of their 2003 reports. According to the 
respective company descriptions on Hoover’s [Hoovers, 2004], Mohawk Industries appears to dominate the market 
in this table, however they are only the second largest manufacturer of carpets and rugs in the United States (largest 
is Shaw Industries, however not public). They also produce ceramic, stone, vinyl, and wood flooring. While heavily 
based in the residential market, Mohawk demonstrates customer focus by covering the complete flooring market and 
by growing continuously through acquisitions [Mohawk, 2003]. Interface produces modular carpets, office panels 
(cubicles), and upholstery fabrics. Their focus is commercial carpeting, and they are considered leaders in the area 
of sustainability and environmental responsibility, which provides them a competitive advantage in commercial 
buildings [Interface, 2003]. The Dixie Group manufactures commercial and residential carpets as a vertically 
integrated manufacturer. By the end of 2003 the company sold a significant portion of their assets to Shaw Industries 
in order to focus on the company core in the high end markets, where they have strong brands [Dixie, 2003]. Pergo 
AB is based in Sweden, though about 60% or their sales are in North America. They produce laminated flooring and 
accessories, and their primary strategy revolves around product innovation, design, and product branding while 
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maintaining cost efficiency [Pergo, 2003]. Interceramic (Internacional de Cerámica) produces glazed ceramic floor 
and wall tile and related products for residential and commercial use. Primary markets are Mexico and the US, and 
while maintaining strong brand recognition the company also developed products for private label markets. The 
strategy appears to focus around optimizing and upgrading the distribution network, including own retail entities and 
franchise networks [Internacional de Cerámica, 2003].  
 
 
Table 1: Key Financial Results 
Mio US$ 2003 Mohawk Interface Dixie Group Pergo Interceramic 
Sales 5005 924 234 366 305 
COGS 3539 634 136 286 184 
Assets 4163 895 240 220 308 
Profit 310 -13 -9 -22 4 
Equity 2298 219 96 153 89 
 
 
 The individual company boards are shown in the appendix. While earlier papers investigated the financial 
situation of individual companies and compared companies of similar size, real market situations may have vastly 
different size companies competing with each other. Figure 1 shows the six companies as the group making up the 
competitive group as they would look in an income/outcome™ simulation.  
 
Figure 1: I/O™ Company Boards for five Competitors 
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 Seeing the five boards next to each other demonstrates that they in fact look very different even though 
they serve the same market. The following attempts to discuss if the Five Forces identified by Porter can be 
recognized in the company boards. 
 
SEGMENT RIVALRY 
 
 Rivalry among competing firms is generally considered the most powerful of the Five Forces [David, 
2004]. This force can lead to an undesirable segment if the number of competitors in a market is very high, or 
competitors are very aggressive [Kotler, 2003], and certain market conditions can make the segment even less 
friendly, e.g. declining demand [Harrigan and Porter, 1983] and high exit barriers like strategic reasons for 
competitors to stay in the market, high fixed cost investments, etc. [Kotler, 2003].  
 
 During the Income/Outcome™ simulation segment rivalry is primarily displayed through the number of 
competitors of similar strength (at least in the beginning of the simulation) and through the declining growth rates in 
market demand. The standard simulation leads to overcapacity as the market grows, and a high financial stake in 
capacity investments and potentially high exit costs lead competitors to compete increasingly aggressive. Segment 
rivalry is very effectively demonstrated by the simulation. Comparing market developments of different participants, 
some more and some less aggressive, also shows that competition does not have to be price competition and can 
lead to high average profits, but as soon as any of the competing teams begins a price war, it is virtually impossible 
to maintain significant profit margins for any of the teams. 
 
 This competitive situation cannot be shown on one specific company board other than the resulting low 
profits, and the dynamics of aggressive price competition are most visible during the market simulation, which 
happens off the company board. Market conditions that lead to fierce segment rivalry are stagnant or declining 
demand, and they are not visible on the company board. During the simulation this information is available to 
participants, just like market research reports provide this kind of information to competitors in a real market. The 
resulting low profit margins due to a price war are visible on company boards, and the floor coverings market 
clearly shows some of those signs as the profit margins in Table 2 indicate.  
 
 
Table 2: Profit Margins by Firm 
Company Mohawk Interface Dixie Group Pergo Interceramic 
Profit Margin 6.2% (1.4%) (3.8%) (6.0%) 1.3% 
 
 
 Of course declining markets are not the only reason for fierce segment competition. Other reasons deal 
more with company or even industry specific circumstances, e.g., high exit barriers [Kotler, 2003]. High exit 
barriers can be due to technical as well as economic conditions that make it undesirable or impossible to discontinue 
or downscale an operation. High investments into inflexible production capacities, investments into brand equity, or 
high environmental costs when discontinuing an operation can provide great reasons for a company to seek orders 
through aggressive pricing.  
 
 On the Income/Outcome™ company board the onset of such conditions can be seen if there is large build-
up of fixed assets, either in land & building or in equipment. It is important to consider the absolute value as well as 
the value of assets relative to company size (e.g., expressed through sales volume), and both can be done visually on 
the company board. All companies in the case study have significant investments. In the case of Mohawk and 
Interface the largest portion of assets stems from intangible assets like goodwill. This may reflect a stake in market 
or brand equity rather than physical capacity. Just like physical production assets intangible assets cannot easily be 
downscaled without incurring a significant loss. Thus maintaining cash flow to continue operations even at low or 
negative profit margins is a viable consideration. Of all the companies in this study, only Pergo has significantly 
lower assets than sales volume. However, their Cost of Goods Sold is much higher at 78.1% than any of the other 
companies. The lowest COGS is enjoyed by the Dixie Group with 58.1%. It should be noted that both these 
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extremes show the two lowest profit margins of the group for 2003, showing that COGS alone is not the key to 
success.  
 
 The second major cost group is factory and corporate overheads, and here Mohawk Industries clearly lies 
ahead of the competition with 23.1% as can be seen when comparing the company boards. This is where the losses 
of the Dixie Group occurred (45.7% overhead), and they are likely to be caused by the restructuring efforts towards 
the end of 2003.   
 
POTENTIAL ENTRANTS 
 
 The threat of new competitors entering the market is closely related to the intensity of segment rivalry as 
they will increase capacity in a given market. The degree of threat by new competitors depends mostly on the level 
of market entry barriers, such as how quickly they can gain economies of scale, experience, brand recognition, and 
what kind of access they have to distribution and supply channels [David, 2004, Kotler, 2003]. In the floor covering 
industry production capacities and know how as well as distribution channels provide a significant entry barrier, but 
companies from related industries can certainly make their way into the distribution channels (as the case of 
Interceramic shows).  
 
 This second force is typically not shown during the Income/Outcome™ simulation and is not visible on the 
company boards. For the simulation it could be introduced via script, but company reaction is typically no different 
to new entrants than it is to existing competitors.  
 
SUBSTITUTES 
 
 The threat of substitute products can be even more difficult to assess than new entrants into the market. 
Substitute products, whether they are developed within the market by the company or its direct competitors or 
whether developed by companies outside the existing market (by potential entrants), not only change the supply-
demand balance by providing more supply, but they typically also change the cost structure and provided benefit 
structure of the supply in the market. Substitute products immediately put pressure on the price levels in the market 
due to increased supply and possibly due to their better cost structure; if the benefits of the of the substitute product 
are significantly higher due to better technology, improved safety features, etc., even reduced profit margins may not 
be able to maintain market share. 
 
 The described market already includes many of the typical substitutes for carpeting, i.e. wood, vinyl, and 
tile flooring. While some companies focus on carpeting, others offer tile flooring or offer the complete variety of 
floor covering products. At the same time it is important to be aware of any technological changes that may alter the 
cost structure of the existing products or provide new substitute products in the market. Especially if these 
substitutes are developed by existing competitors, entry barriers to the market that may deter new entrants (e.g., 
access to the distribution channels and brand reputation) are nonexistent and such substitutes can penetrate the 
market rather rapidly. On a strategic level, substitutions can also change the market structures by either creating sub-
markets or by blurring former segment lines and combining formerly separate segments [Porter, 1985]. 
 
 The company board in its standard version does not consider multiple products or substitution products. A 
strategic version of the simulation considers multiple products and markets and accounts for development time and 
market access considerations. The standard version of the simulation considers product improvements and market 
sub-segments; these are viewed from the existing market as a tool available to all competitors, and their use can be 
displayed on the company boards. While information on such relative advantages like better productivity, better 
product features, etc. are difficult to determine from annual statements and are therefore not displayed in the 
company boards in the appendix, they can be shown on company boards if such information is provided. However, 
potential substitute products that are not yet existent can only be shown as an intangible asset, and it is very 
problematic to quantify.  
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BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
 
 The bargaining power of suppliers is a significant force as supplier prices are a key determinant of the 
company’s overall cost and cost structure. Supplier power is determined by degree of concentration and organization 
of the suppliers, the availability of substitute input factors and the cost of switching, and finally by the potential of 
vertically integrative moves in the industry [Porter, 1985, Kotler, 2003]. Another key factor to supplier bargaining 
power is the magnitude of the company’s demand relative to the total supply market. While large volume buying is 
typically viewed as a bargaining chip for the buyer, it also limits the supply alternatives and therefore makes a 
company more vulnerable to suppliers. 
 
 The considered companies use similar raw materials when it comes to yarns in the carpet area, and in the 
case of the Dixie Group we see a vertically integrated company where the supplier threat has been shifted (there are 
still suppliers for Dixie, but they are fiber producers rather than yarn producers, and those supply market conditions 
can be quite different. Carpet substitutes wood, tile, and vinyl use very different raw materials that are likely to have 
very different supply dynamics as well. There is no significant evidence that the supplier bargaining power is 
unusually high in this market. 
 
 The company board does not indicate supplier power as this happens outside the company walls. At the 
same time the effects of supplier power can be shown on the board through limitations in raw material supply and 
through payment conditions, assuming that powerful suppliers do not have to extent generous payment terms. 
During the simulation threats of supplier power can be scripted into the raw material dynamics. Market dynamics on 
the supply side can be simulated similar to the market simulation on the buyer side. Supply chain interruptions and 
imbalances are more typically simulated by supply-chain simulations, but given the general overcapacity in the fiber 
and yarn markets this does not appear to be a relevant threat to the industry.  
 
BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS 
 
 The bargaining power of buyers is the counterpart to supplier power, and it is determined in a similar 
fashion by the degree of concentration and organization of the buyers, the degree of product differentiation, 
availability of substitutes and switching cost, potential for vertical integration, and general price sensitivity of the 
product [Porter, 1985, Kotler, 2003].  
 
Typically profit margins are used as an indicator for strength in the market, and this would indicate a strong 
consumer market in the analyzed segment. The largest competitor (Mohawk) fairs the best using this measure, and 
this may in part be due to the fact that their product range covers all floor covering possibilities. Other producers 
focus on specific sub-segments, e.g. Interface on the commercial applications or Interceramic on ceramic tiles, but 
this product differentiation does not seem to overcome pricing and therefore profit aspects in the observed 
timeframe.  
 
The company board itself shows only the results of buyers’ power in form of profits and profit margins. 
The simulation however has a strong focus on this aspect of the market and does allow cost strategies as well as 
product differentiation strategies to be represented. As such, the ability to differentiate the product through 
specialization or customization or quality efforts as well as the ability to produce more cost efficiently than other 
firms can be visualized on the company board. Typically this requires some inside information so that the degree of 
product differentiation or cost efficiency can be displayed appropriately for different competitors. One indicator in 
this case might be the costs of goods sold, and this would indicate that the Dixie Group and Interceramic are 
working more cost efficiently than their competitors. Unfortunately it is not possible to deduct from the annual 
reports how different the respective product differentiations really are.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As shown previously the Income/Outcome™ company board allows effective visualization of the financial 
and structural situation of a company. This paper investigated if competitive forces as described by Porter can also 
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be visualized though the use of the company board. There are clear limitations if one relies exclusively on data from 
annual reports, as the relative ranking of factors outside the company is difficult without some inside information. If 
such information is available, segment rivalry as well as the bargaining power of suppliers and of buyers can be 
visualized and simulated with the company boards. It may also be possible to simulate the threat of new competition 
entering the market if such information is available. Development of substitute products is probably most difficult to 
represent on the standard company boards, because they typically only show one product type. The strategic 
simulation board allows some expansion showing different products with different product development 
requirements, and this may be a possibility to visualize and simulate the threat of substitute products as well.  
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